Has the recent wave of capital controls and prudential foreign exchange (FX) measures been e¤ective in promoting exchange rate stability? We tackle this question by studying a panel of 25 countries/currencies from July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2011. We calculate daily measures of exchange rate volatility, absolute crash risk, and tail risk implied in currency option prices, and we construct indices of capital controls and prudential FX measures taking into account the exact date when policy changes are implemented. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, we …nd evidence that (i) tightening controls on nonresidents suppresses daily exchange rate ‡uctuations at the cost of increasing the frequency of outliers, (ii) easing controls on residents truly improves exchange rate stability over all dimensions, and (iii) tightening prudential FX measures not speci…c to derivative markets reduces absolute crash risk and tail risk, with no e¤ect on volatility.
Introduction
Do macroeconomic policies designed to curb the volatility of a given variable necessarily make it more stable? Not always. In some cases, daily ‡uctuations may become less volatile at the cost of increasing the frequency of outliers. 1 In this paper, we show that this is the case for certain types of controls on cross-border capital ‡ows and their e¤ects on exchange rates.
Despite their long (and renewed) popularity, the bene…ts of capital controls and prudential foreign exchange (FX) measures remain elusive. Two comprehensive surveys of the literature conclude that capital controls "have had little power to stop speculative attacks on regimes that were seen by the market as inconsistent" (Dooley, 1997, p. 677) and that "empirical analysis has failed to yield conclusive results" (Eichengreen, 2001 , p. 341). Glick and Hutchison (2005) and Glick In this paper, we shed additional light on the topic in a couple of new ways. First, we study the e¤ects of capital controls and prudential FX measures on market participants'expectations regarding the distribution of future exchange rate movements. In particular, we focus on three key aspects of these distributions: One dimension is given by daily ‡uctuations, and is generally referred to as "volatility"; the second dimension is given by a large probability of a sudden correction in one particular direction (for instance, a currency that is overvalued suddenly depreciating), which we will refer to as "absolute crash risk"; and the …nal dimension relates to the probability of observing outliers, commonly referred to as "tail risk." We construct daily measures of implied volatility, absolute crash risk, and tail risk based on the second, (absolute value of the) third, and fourth moments, respectively, of risk-neutral probability density functions extracted from currency options.
Second, we acknowledge that the recent wave of policies aimed at curbing the destabilizing e¤ects of large capital ‡ows has been typically implemented through gradual steps. For instance, Turkey increased the required reserve ratio for foreign currency liabilities from 9% to 9.5% on April 30, 2010, then from 9.5% to 10% on August 6, 2010, and …nally from 10% Third, we analyze a sample of countries that experienced large net capital in ‡ows in the aftermath of the 2008 global …nancial crisis. The two-speed world economic recovery that followed the crisis-unimpressive in the United States, Europe, and Japan, but stronger in other smaller advanced countries and emerging markets-divided central banks into very different policy stances. On one side, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan with near-zero policy rates and unprecedented levels of monetary expansion. On the other side, smaller advanced countries and emerging markets with positive policy rates, which appeared more appropriate given the stage of their business cycles. Investors naturally ‡ed liquidity-exporting countries in search of higher yields. Wary of the potentially destabilizing e¤ects of surges in capital in ‡ows, policymakers in some of the liquidity-importing countries again resorted to policies aimed at discouraging foreign currency in ‡ows and creating a macroprudential liquidity bu¤er. We believe this backdrop provides a favorable setup for identi…cation. Speci…cally, we use the fact that not all countries experiencing surges in capital in ‡ows implemented capital controls or prudential FX measures during the sample period as an opportunity to apply a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach.
We combine both data sets into a daily panel of 25 countries/currencies quoted against the U.S. dollar (USD) from July 1, 2009, until June 30, 2011. 2 Our treatment group includes 12 liquidity-importing countries that implemented policy changes during our sample period (Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey), and our control group includes 13 liquidity-importing countries that did not experience any relevant regulatory change in capital controls or prudential measures (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland). We …nd empirical evidence that the tightening of capital controls on nonresidents creates an illusory stability gain: it suppresses daily exchange rate ‡uctuations but at the cost of increasing the likelihood of currency crisis and with no clear e¤ect on absolute crash risk. 3 Notwithstanding, our results also suggest that the easing of capital controls on residents truly improves exchange rate stability, as it signi…cantly reduces the volatility, the asymmetry, and the "thickness"of the distribution tails of expected exchange rate changes over the short, medium, and long terms. Finally, we show that the tightening of prudential FX measures that are not speci…c to derivative markets reduces absolute crash risk and tail risk with no signi…cant e¤ect on volatility. This is not the …rst paper to study the contrasting e¤ects of macroeconomic policies on normal and more extreme types of exchange rate ‡uctuations. Engel and Hakkio (1993) analyze target zones in the context of the European Monetary System (EMS). They …nd that exchange rates in a target zone are subject to extreme volatility around times of realignment, which is not the case for exchange rates in a ‡oating regime. The same authors observe that "EMS exchange rates have more outliers than ‡oating exchange rates, but EMS outliers are less volatile than ‡oating rate outliers" (Engel and Hakkio, 1996 , p. 56). Our paper also relates to several studies on carry trade and crash and tail risks, such as Jurek (2007) , Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) , and Chernov, Graveline, and Zviadadze (2012). However, our paper is the …rst to show that capital controls a¤ect di¤erent dimensions of exchange rate risk in di¤erent-and sometimes opposing-ways.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 discusses the extraction of probability density functions from currency options and presents our measures of implied volatility and tail risk. Section 3 explains the construction of our indices of policy changes in capital controls and prudential FX measures. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy.
Section 5 presents the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Measures of Exchange Rate Stability

Recovering Risk-Neutral Probability Density Functions
The FX derivative market is one of the largest and most liquid in the world. Regarding its magnitude, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reported in June 2012 that roughly USD 67 trillion in notional over-the-counter derivatives are outstanding globally. 4 With a large number of contracts and market participants, it is safe to argue that derivative prices should re ‡ect investors'views concerning the distribution of the underlying assets.
Under a general set of assumptions, …nance theory dictates that the price of any asset should equal the discounted expected value of its future cash ‡ows. Moreover, the expected value is taken over the risk-neutral density. Since the cash ‡ows from a derivative transaction are a direct function of the price of the underlying asset, its price must take into account the asset's distribution. Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) were the …rst to show how one could back out the risk-neutral density of price moves from a set of derivative prices. More precisely, 4 See BIS (2012).
the authors demonstrate that, by di¤erentiating derivative prices with respect to the price of the underlying asset, one can obtain the probability density function. To illustrate this point, the value of a call option is the expected value of its payo¤ on the expiration date T discounted back to the present. So, if C is the price of a call option, we have 5
where X is the strike price, r is the risk-free interest rate, S T is the spot price at maturity and f (S T ) represents the risk-neutral probability function of the price of the underlying asset.
The second derivative of C is then
By rearranging:
Therefore, based on equation (3), if one wishes to obtain the value of the risk-neutral density, a continuum of strike prices is necessary. In reality however, such data are unavailable, and one needs to resort to an interpolation scheme that builds on existing prices. Within the context of options on FX markets, Malz (1997) proposes an interpolation methodology that builds on the most common traded securities within the asset class. The author argues that traders in this market demonstrate a desire to deal with securities that exploit speci…c features of the risk-neutral densities. Most of these securities are redundant in that they are linear combinations of canonical securities like call and put options. The straddle, risk reversal, and strangle appear to be the most common instruments, which we will brie ‡y describe.
In this paper, we follow Malz (1997) by focusing on two strategies: risk reversal (rr) and strangle (str). We demonstrate that the combination of these strategies with an at-the-money option allows one to uncover option prices across a set of strikes. 6 5 A general and well-known market convention is that option prices are usually quoted in terms of implied volatilities as backed out from the Black-Scholes formula. 6 In the option market literature, such linkage between option and strike prices is usually referred as the Risk reversals are strategies that combine a long position in out-of-the-money calls (puts) with a short position in out-of-the-money puts (calls). The options share the same maturities and deltas. 7 The goal of this strategy is to explore the fact that, unlike the Black-Scholes formula, exchange rates deviate from the lognormal distribution. Therefore, the investor can pro…t when prices move signi…cantly.
Finally, in a strangle the investor takes long positions in out-of-the-money calls and puts with same maturities and deltas. The investor can, in this case, pro…t when prices increase or decrease signi…cantly. Strangle prices share a unique feature in that they are quoted as a spread from at-the-money option prices.
We let (0:75) and (0:25) represent the 25-delta put and call options respectively, and let atm t be the implied volatility of the at-the-money option. 8 Therefore, we arrive at the following system of equations based on the discussion above:
str t = 0:5(
By rearranging equations (4) and (5), we can …nd the implied volatilities as a function of the priced strategies:
(0:25) t = atm t + str t + 0:5rr t (6) (0:75) t = atm t + str t 0:5rr t .
Equations (6) and (7) display the implied volatilities for a given set of deltas. It is clear from this discussion, that we can only uncover the implied volatilities at points for which we have observed prices. In most cases, this happens only on a small set of points, and in order to get a continuum of prices we need to make use of some interpolation scheme. To do so, volatility smile. 7 The option deltas are used to describe the moneyness of the option-a measure of how far current prices are from observed strike prices. 8 All the analysis for 25-delta options can be applied for di¤erent deltas as well. In such case, one would need the prices of strategies, which are obviously dependent on a corresponding set of deltas.
we use two approaches that have been used elsewhere in the literature. In the …rst case, we follow Malz (1997) and assume the following speci…cation:
In this case, the volatility smile can be decomposed into three components. The …rst two are just linear functions of the at-the-money option and the risk reversal accounting from deviations from 0.5 delta. The last component is a quadratic function of the strangle and deviations from the 0.5 delta. The form is very simple, and each of the components attempts to capture features of the volatility smile. More precisely, the at-the-money option, the risk reversal and the strangle capture the level, the skew, and the curvature in the volatility smile, respectively. To get the parameters b 0 ,b 1 , and b 2 , one just needs to make sure that the implied volatilities at observed data match exactly. For a 0.25 delta, the parameter vector (b 0 ; b 1 ; b 2 ) equals (1; 2; 16). 9 Although rather simple, the above method lacks a …nancial interpretation. To address this issue, Castagna and Mercurio (2007) , building on the work of Lipton and McGhee (2002) , devised the vanna-volga method for FX options based on a replicating portfolio argument.
More precisely, prices of nontraded options can be recovered through a static hedge strategy that matches all partial derivatives up to the second order. 10 By adding the higher moments into the hedging exercise, they demonstrate that one needs to have prices for options with at least three di¤erent strike prices. Therefore, for an option with maturity T , the implied volatility at strike X is approximately related to the implied volatilities of three other traded options with the same maturity and strikes X 1 < X 2 < X 3 through: We also obtain daily USD LIBOR interest rates from Bloomberg for the same maturities over the same sample period. We apply the above methodology to our data set and calculate daily risk-neutral probability density functions (PDF) for each country/currency and for each tenor (3, 6 , and 12 months). [Insert Tables 1 to 3 about here]
Using the daily options-implied PDFs for each of the 25 currencies in our sample from emerging markets are more susceptible to external shocks. Furthermore, it is more common to observe …xed or managed ‡oating exchange rate regimes in these countries. Regarding to the symmetry of the PDFs, in almost all countries the probability of a signi…cant depreciation against the USD is larger than that of an appreciation, with the largest average values of implied skewness being observed in South Korea, Russia, Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia (although not always in this particular order). The only two countries that registered negative average implied skewness over the sample period were China (-0.7, -0.5, and -0.3 over the 3-, 6-, and 12-month horizons, respectively) and Switzerland for the 6-and 12-month horizons (-0.1 in both cases). Finally, outliers are more frequent in emerging markets (China, Indonesia, and Russia over 3 months; Indonesia, Russia, and Brazil over 6 months; and Indonesia, Russia, and South Korea over 12 months), while all countries with the lowest levels of implied tail risk are developed (Norway, Switzerland, and Japan).
3 Capital Controls and Prudential FX Measures
De…nition of Relevant Policy Changes
We use the IMF's AREAER to compile two indices of policy changes in de jure capital controls and prudential FX measures for each individual country in our sample. 12 As already mentioned in the introduction, our motivation for the construction of such indices is to gauge the e¤ectiveness of policies aimed at curbing potentially destabilizing e¤ects of large portfolio in ‡ows. Hence, our capital control index only includes policy changes aimed at easing or tightening restrictions on cross-border …nancial transactions typically associated with speculative "hot money,"that is, when the investment decision does not involve a lasting economic interest in the management of the enterprise concerned. 13 For instance, equity shares and …xed-income securities such as bonds, bills, short-term government paper, bankers' acceptances, commercial paper, interbank deposits, and repurchase agreements. For similar reasons, we also disregard policy changes that only a¤ect the reinvestment of dividends or earnings. We further distinguish among policies imposed explicitly to a¤ect the absolute size of transactions (quantity-based), the timing of transactions (time-based), or the returns of transactions (price-based), as well as between restrictions on nonresidents' ability to invest in domestic assets and restrictions on residents' ability to invest in foreign assets. For instance, South 
Policy Changes Over Time and Across Countries
Applying the criteria described above, we identify a total of 60 relevant policy changes in capital controls and prudential FX measures over the course of our sample period, from July 10 are speci…c to FX derivatives, and the majority tightened rather than eased the regulatory framework (27 versus 9). With respect to capital controls, changes in quantity-based controls are more popular than price-based, while time-based controls are the least popular (12, 10, and 2 policy changes, respectively). Additionally, changes in controls on nonresidents are more common than controls on residents (14 versus 10). Finally, changes in capital controls are split exactly between tightening and easing measures (12 each), but with most of the easing policy changes occurring through controls on residents (9).
[Insert Table 4 
Construction of Indices
The capital control index, CCI it , and prudential FX measure index, P M I F X it calculate the cumulative number of relevant policy changes implemented by each individual country over the sample period. Each country is assigned a value of zero in the …rst day of our sample period, July 1, 2009, and changes that tighten capital controls or prudential regulations add a value of one to the respective cumulative index on the day they become e¤ective, while changes that ease capital controls or prudential regulations subtract a value of one. 15 As a result, our indices are not simply on/o¤ indicators of the presence of restrictions to cross-border …nancial transactions; they convey additional information about the intensity with which certain capital controls or prudential measures are being used by a country. Notwithstanding, the mapping is only indirect, as most policy changes are not perfectly comparable to each other with regards to their intensity levels. Let's take the case of India as an example. The cash reserve requirement (CRR), which is set at the same level for local and foreign liabilities, was increased from 5% to 5.5% on February 13, 2010, then increased to 5.75% on February 27, and …nally to 6% on April 24, 2010. These policy changes are not uniform, but their intensities could be compared, since the …rst CRR raise is twice the absolute size of the other two subsequent increases. However, over the same period India also raised the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) required for both domestic and foreign currency from 24% to 25% of net demand and time liabilities on October 27, 2009, and then lowered it back to 24% on December 18, 2010. Once again, we could argue that both the increase and decrease in SLR are of equal intensity, as both changes have the exact same absolute value. The issue, though, is how to compare the intensity of a 1% absolute change in SLR to a 0.25% or 0.5% absolute change in CRR, as both types of policy instruments are included in India's prudential FX measures index. To avoid the subjectivity inherent in such calls, we assign an absolute value of one to all prudential measures, using positive and negative signs to distinguish tightening from easing. In sum, CCI it and P M I F X it are objective counts of the number of policy changes in de jure capital controls and prudential in an objective way, as opposed to resorting to subjective value judgment as in Quinn (1997) and Quinn and Toyoda (2008) . Fourth, they are compiled at a daily frequency, which makes them uniquely suited to interact with daily data on …nancial market behavior. Finally, the major drawback of our indices is that di¤erent countries tend to like using their own set of policy tools, which are rarely directly comparable. Consequently, the coe¢ cients estimated using our indices as regressors measure the average e¤ect of the policy tools included within a category. 16 
Empirical Strategy
We use as dependent variables proxies for three di¤erent dimensions of exchange rate stability extracted from currency options: implied volatility, absolute crash risk, and tail risk. Note that we use the absolute value of skewness and not skewness itself as the dependent variable.
Although crash risk refers to a large positive skewness (that is, a distribution of expected future exchange rate changes skewed towards large depreciations), we believe that a distribution skewed towards large appreciations is also undesirable. From a policymaker's point of view, a more symmetric distribution is better than large asymmetry in any direction.
Each equation is estimated three times, each time using exchange rate implied volatility, absolute crash risk, and tail risk extracted from currency options of di¤erent tenors ( = 3, 6, and 12 months). We include as regressors our newly constructed series of cumulative policy changes in capital controls and prudential FX measures. We disaggregate capital controls according to the type of ‡ows and location of the agent being restricted (p = price-based controls on nonresidents, quantity-based controls on nonresidents, time-based controls on nonresidents, quantity-based controls on residents) and prudential FX measures according to the type of FX market being a¤ected (q = FX derivatives, other FX assets and liabilities). 17 We include country …xed e¤ects to control for omitted variables that vary across countries but not over time (such as di¤erences in initial levels of capital openness or exchange rate regime choices) as well as time e¤ects to control for omitted variables that vary over time but not across countries (such as changes in risk aversion of investors in the liquidity exporting countries, which could be proxied by the VIX). One widely known issue with di¤erence-in-di¤erences (see Bertrand et al., 2004 ) and panel estimation with …nancial data in general (see Petersen, 2009 ) is that the OLS assumption that residuals are uncorrelated leads to biased standard errors. Speci…cally, the null hypothesis of no e¤ect tends to be largely over-rejected for any given con…dence level. To correct this bias, we calculate standard errors that account for two dimensions of within cluster correlation:
correlation among di¤erent countries on the same date, and correlation between di¤erent dates in the same country. Intuitively, we are allowing …nancial shocks to a¤ect multiple currencies at the same time and country speci…c shocks to be serially correlated.
The di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach helps prevent some of the main perils associated with single country studies. For instance, imagine a case in which a truly e¤ective prudential FX measure is introduced in some countries at the same time as a major deterioration in global market conditions. The countries that implement the prudential FX measure experience increased exchange rate instability-although the increase is signi…cantly smaller than for countries that did not implement the prudential FX measure. While single country studies would suggest that such policy has the opposite of the desired e¤ect, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator would correctly identify its bene…ts. Alternatively, imagine a scenario in which some countries enact an innocuous policy change in capital control and, by chance, global …nancial market conditions substantially improve. While single country studies would tend to conclude that the policy change caused the improvement in exchange rate stability, di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators would only suggest this if the reduction in volatility, absolute crash risk, or tail risk experienced by the treatment group were signi…cantly larger in magnitude than that experienced by the control group.
In theory, countries from the control and treatment groups should be identical except in one aspect, the implementation of policy changes in capital controls and prudential FX measures (i.e., the adoption of the "treatment"). Unfortunately, this ideal setup is only available for controlled experiments. However, Figures 6, 7, and 8 reveal that the monthly behaviors of the outcome variables (implied volatility, absolute crash risk, and tail risk, respectively) over the 3-, 6-, and 12-month periods in the control and treatment groups are very similar, especially in the period preceding the implementation of policy changes. 18 In Figure 6 , we plot the monthly average of implied volatility for the control group (blue line) and three di¤erent treatment groups: countries that on average have tightened capital controls on nonresidents Curiously, that is exactly the same period when most policy changes are implemented (see
Figures 4 and 5).
[Insert Figure 6 , 7, and 8 about here] Figure 7 and 8 show analogous pictures for the monthly average of the absolute crash risk and tail risk. In both cases, the behavior of the control group (blue line) is similar to that of the treatment groups up to the second half of 2010. After that period, countries that have tightened controls on nonresidents (red line) seem to experience an increase in both types of risk, countries that have eased controls on residents (green line) seem to experience a decrease, and countries that have tightened prudential FX measures not speci…c to derivatives markets (yellow line) continue to behave in a similar way to the control group.
5 Estimation Output
Baseline Regressions
There are three sets of three regressions in Table 5 . Each set refers to results obtained using currency options of di¤erent tenors (3-, 6-, and 12-months, respectively). Within each set, each regression has a di¤erent dependent variable: implied volatility, or the standard deviation of the risk-neutral PDF; implied absolute crash risk, or the absolute value of the skewness of the risk-neutral PDF; and implied tail risk, or the kurtosis of the risk-neutral PDF, respectively.
Once again, the dependent variables are in natural logs, so the estimated coe¢ cients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities: they gauge the percent increase in each moment of the distribution resulting from a one-unit policy change (i.e., tightening) in capital controls or prudential FX measures.
[Insert Table 5 about here] Table 5 reveals that capital controls on nonresidents, regardless of their type (price-, quantity-, or time-based) have qualitatively similar e¤ects. First, the tightening of capital controls on nonresidents signi…cantly reduces the implied volatility over all horizons, with the exception of quantity-based controls over the 12-month horizon, which is associated with a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient. The e¤ect on implied volatility ranges from a reduction of 1.6% to 2.5% for price-based controls, a reduction of 14.5% to 23.8% for timebased controls, and a reduction of 31.3% to an increase of 8.5% for each unit of policy change.
Second, there is no clear evidence of bene…ts associated with tightening capital controls on nonresidents with respect to absolute crash risk. When we focus on the 3-month horizon, the tightening of price-based controls on nonresidents reduces the absolute skewness of the exchange rate distribution, the tightening of quantity-based controls on nonresidents signi…-cantly increases it, and the tightening of time-based controls renders a nonsigni…cant coe¢ -cient. When we look at the 6-and 12-month horizons, all estimated coe¢ cients associated with controls on nonresidents are not statistically signi…cant. Third, with respect to implied tail risk, the pattern is very clear: all estimated coe¢ cients associated with controls on nonresidents are positive and statistically signi…cant, regardless of type and horizon. Moreover, the side e¤ects on fourth moments have semi-elasticities comparable to the bene…ts on second moments. A one-unit increase in controls on nonresidents increases the implied tail risk by 1.5% to 2.0% for price-based controls, 17.4% to 43.1% for quantity-based controls, and 9.0% to 12.3% for time-based controls. All in all, our baseline regression suggests that the tightening of capital controls on nonresidents indeed reduces the implied volatility of exchange rates, but the gained stability in second moments comes at a cost of increased kurtosis, and with no clear bene…ts regarding absolute skewness. In other words, restrictions on the ability of nonresidents to hold domestic assets are associated with illusory exchange rate stability: they suppress daily ‡uctuations while increasing the likelihood of currency crisis, with no e¤ect on crash risk.
While the gains from tightening controls on nonresidents are illusive, policies aimed at easing the ability of residents to hold foreign assets are a di¤erent story. and over all horizons (3-, 6-, and 12-month), with the only exception being the coe¢ cient associated with implied volatility over the 3-month horizon (which is not statistically significant). Given that our index codes the easing of capital controls on residents as negative values, these estimates imply that such policies are truly e¤ective in rendering exchange rate stability: a one-unit policy change easing on controls on residents suppresses daily exchange rate ‡uctuations with a reduction on the implied standard deviation of 3.7% to 6.1%; improves the symmetry of the distribution of expected exchange rate changes with a reduction on the absolute value of the implied skewness of 54.3% to 81.1%; and decreases the likelihood of currency crises with a reduction of the implied kurtosis of 6.7% to 7.2%. 
Disaggregation at Country Level
Our …rst major concern regarding the interpretation of the results obtained from our baseline regressions relates to the cross-country aggregation of the capital control and prudential FX measure indices. Although we disaggregate capital controls by type of ‡ows and location of agent being restricted and prudential FX measures by market, within each of these subcategories policy changes from di¤erent countries are all coded equally with an absolute value of one. However, di¤erent countries rely on di¤erent speci…c policy tools, which are most often not directly comparable. To illustrate the potential problem this aggregation may cause, imagine a scenario in which four di¤erent countries ease controls on residents, but with di¤erent speci…c toolkits and di¤erent levels of intensity. Moreover, imagine that the policy changes are innocuous in three countries but very successful in one of them. If the bene…cial e¤ects of the policy change in the successful country are strong enough, our baseline regressions could report a statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient associated to the easing of controls on residents, which would lead us to naively conclude that easing such policies are generally e¤ective. To check whether the results obtained from our baseline regressions are driven by exceptionally successful individual experiences, we reestimate equations (10), (11), and (12) using capital control and prudential FX measure indices, which are disaggregated at the country level. The resulting estimation output presented in Table 6 reveals that this is not the case. By and large, estimation output obtained from the experiences of individual countries clearly supports our previous interpretation.
[Insert Table 6 about here] Table 6 shows that the estimated coe¢ cients associated with the tightening of controls on nonresidents are almost all negative and statistically signi…cant in the implied volatility equations, with the exception of China's quantity-based controls over the 12-month horizon (which is positive and signi…cant); almost all positive and statistically signi…cant in the implied tail risk equations, with the exception of Brazil's price-based controls over the 3-month horizon (which is not signi…cant); and there is no clear pattern in the absolute crash risk equations, which are negative and signi…cant for Brazil's price-based controls, positive and signi…cant for China's quantity-based control over the 3-month horizon, and not signi…cant for the remaining coe¢ cients. Table 6 also con…rms our previous reading that easing capital controls on residents renders a more symmetric and less leptokurtic distribution of future expected exchange rate changes over all horizons. With respect to second moments, easing capital controls also reduces volatility in most countries, especially over the 6-and 12-month horizons, with the exception of Colombia, in which easing controls on nonresidents seems to increase volatility.
Individual country experiences with prudential FX measures speci…c to FX derivatives only provide a clear pattern in the tail risk equations, in which statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients are all positive. In the implied volatility and absolute crash risk equations, we …nd positive and signi…cant, negative and signi…cant, and not signi…cant coe¢ cients. Once again, we believe that it is ill-advised to draw any conclusion from these coe¢ cients, since regulation speci…c to FX derivative markets creates noise in FX option prices. Finally, estimated coe¢ cients associated with prudential FX measures for other FX assets and liabilities reinforce the idea that the tightening of such policies signi…cantly reduces absolute crash risk and tail risk for all countries. Nonetheless, the results reveal some heterogeneity in the bene…cial e¤ects, which tend to be signi…cant over all horizons for most countries but concentrated in the short run for Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa. Regarding the e¤ect of such policies on second moments, no clear pattern can be obtained from individual experiences, which combines some signi…cantly positive, signi…cantly negative, and not signi…cant coe¢ cients.
In sum, empirical evidence presented in this section obtained from individual country experiences yields the same conclusions from the baseline regressions using more aggregate capital control and prudential FX measure indices.
Base Currency E¤ect
The exchange rates of the 25 countries in our sample are all quoted against the USD. However, it is reasonable to expect the EUR to be the most natural choice of base currency for the European economies in our sample, given their stronger trade and …nancial linkages with the European Monetary Union. 19 In this robustness check, we test whether the choice of base currency could be driving the results. For instance, imagine an alternative hypothesis in which capital controls and prudential FX measures have no signi…cant e¤ects on exchange rate volatility, crash risk, and tail risk, when the currencies are quoted against their natural base (i.e., USD for Latin American and Asian economies, EUR for European economies).
However, when we force European economies to be quoted against the USD, we add another layer of risk from the e¤ects of the Greek debt crisis on the EUR/USD exchange rate. Under this alternative story, if the number of European countries is unevenly distributed between the treatment and control groups, the null hypothesis of no e¤ect could be rejected. In particular, if there are more European countries in the control group than in the treatment group (and since the European countries are experiencing an increase in volatility due to the base currency conversion), then our baseline regressions could mislead us to conclude that the treatment is e¤ective in reducing volatility. Going back to Table 4 , we can see that this alternative story is a plausible concern. Out of the nine European countries in our sample, only two have implemented any sort of policy change in capital controls or prudential FX measures. Speci…cally, only Russia and Turkey are in our treatment group.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
We check whether the choice of the USD as base currency for European economies is driving our results by re-estimating our baseline regressions restricting the sample to only include non-European countries. The estimation results presented in Table 7 do not support this alternative hypothesis. The estimated coe¢ cients are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Table 5 in magnitude, sign, and signi…cance.
Emerging Markets and Selection Bias
As Table 4 highlighted, almost all countries in the treatment group are emerging markets.
Out of the nine developed countries in our sample, only one belongs to the treatment groupIsrael, which tightened prudential FX measures. The uneven distribution of emerging markets between the control and treatment groups suggests that institutional factors might play an important role in the adoption of treatment. This raises the potential concern for selection bias:
What we interpret as the e¤ect of policy changes is in fact the e¤ect of di¤erent institutional setups. In our speci…c case, emerging market currencies tend to be less stable-our analysis of Tables 1, 2 , and 3 revealed that emerging markets have the highest observed average levels of volatility, skewness, and kurtosis for all time horizons during the sample period. Hence, if there are more emerging markets in the treatment group, selection bias could lead us to the conclusion that capital controls and prudential FX measures have the opposite of the desired e¤ect.
One way to double-check whether selection bias is indeed an issue is by comparing the behavior of the outcome variables in both control and treatment groups. Our analysis of [Insert Table 8 about here] Table 8 reports the estimation output. Some of the e¤ects seem quantitatively weaker.
The most pronounced change is observed on the e¤ects of a one-unit ease of controls on residents. In our baseline regression, the reduction of implied kurtosis of the distribution of future expected exchange rate changes ranges from 6.7% to 7.2% and the reduction of absolute skewness, from 54.3% to 81.1%. But once we restrict the sample to emerging markets, those e¤ects range from 4.2% to 4.6% and from 24.5% to 53.9%, respectively. However, in qualitative terms, all main conclusions from our baseline regressions remain. Tightening of controls on nonresidents still provide an illusory sense of stability: the reduction in exchange volatility comes at a cost of increasing tail risk. Easing controls on residents is still associated with exchange rate stability by reducing volatility, absolute crash risk, and tail risk over almost all horizons. Finally, tightening prudential FX measures which are not speci…c to FX derivatives signi…cantly reduce tail risk.
Di¤erent Methods of Extracting Risk-Neutral Moments
In this section we check whether our results are speci…c to our method of computing moments of the risk-neutral densities extracted from currency option prices. Speci…cally, we re-estimate our baseline regressions using as dependent variables measures of implied volatility, absolute crash risk, and tail risk calculated using the Vanna-Volga method. As we have explained in Section 2, the main di¤erence between the Malz method and the Vanna-Volga method relies on the shape of the volatility smile. While the Malz method assumes that it is quadratic, the Vanna-Volga method allows for a more general shape, based on construction of locally replicating portfolios. Table 9 shows that estimates of our baseline regressions using moments computed from the Vanna-Volga method are qualitatively identical to ones previously obtained using moments from the Malz method.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Along the same lines, we re-estimate the baseline regressions using as dependent variables the implied volatility prices of at-the-money, 25-delta risk-reversal, and 25-delta butter ‡y currency options. Carr and Wu (2005) show that, under certain assumptions, the implied volatility of the at-the-money straddle and the ratios of the implied volatilities of the riskreversal and butter ‡y relative to the at-the-money straddle can be linked directly to the second, third, and fourth moments of the risk-neutral density of expected changes of the underlying asset.
[Insert Table 10 about here] Table 10 reports the estimation output. We can see that the estimated coe¢ cients associated with policy changes that tighten controls on nonresidents are generallly negative.
However, the size of the e¤ects on the 25-delta butter ‡y tends to be smaller than the size of the e¤ect on at-the-money straddle. This implies that the ratio of the implied volatility price of the butter ‡y relative to the at-the-money straddle is increasing, which, according to Carr and Wu (2005) , is associated with an increase in kurtosis. Table 10 also shows that a one-unit policy easing of capital controls on residents signi…cantly reduces the prices of the at-the-money straddle, the 25 delta risk-reversal, and the 25-delta butter ‡y. However, the magnitude of the e¤ect on the prices of the risk-reversal and butter ‡y are larger, which helps us understand the reduction in skewness and kurtosis described by our baseline regressions. With respect to the tightening of prudential FX measures not speci…c to FX derivatives, Table 10 reviews that the coe¢ cients associated with the implied volatility of at-the-money straddle are not statistically signi…cant with magnitudes very close to zero. Additionally, the coe¢ cients associated with the 25-delta risk-reversal and 25-delta butter ‡y are negative and larger in size, which explains the reduction in skewness and kurtosis captured by the baseline regressions.
Collapsing into Quarterly Data
Our …nal robustness check revisits the "over-rejection of the null hypothesis" problem in di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimations. In our methodological section, we mentioned how Bertrand Table 11 are qualitatively the same as the ones obtained from our baseline regressions with daily data.
[Insert Source: Risk-neutral densities extracted from 3-, 6-, and 12-month currency options using the Malz method. CAD quoted against the USD, that is, a positive expected percent change implies that the CAD is expected to depreciate against the USD. Jul-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10 Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11
12-month implied volatility
Control group
Capital control on nonresidents (+)
Capital control on residents (-) Prudential FX measure -other (+)
Figure 7: Monthly Evolution of Implied Absolute Crash Risk for Control and Treatment Groups
Source: Monthly averages of natural logs of daily tail risk data from July 1, 2009, and June 30, 2011. Absolute crash risk is calculated as the absolute value of the third moment (skewness) of risk-neutral densities extracted from currency options using the Malz method. The symbols "+" and "-" denote that treatment group includes only countries that on average have tightened and eased, respectively, capital controls or prudential FX measures. Jul-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10 Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11 12-month implied absolute crash risk
Control group Capital control on nonresidents (+)
Figure 8: Monthly Evolution of Implied Tail Risk for Control and Treatment Groups
Source: Monthly averages of natural logs of daily tail risk data from July 1 st , 2009 and June 30, 2011. Tail risk is calculated as the fourth moment (kurtosis) of risk-neutral densities extracted from currency options using the Malz method. The symbols "+" and "-" denote that treatment group includes only countries that on average have tightened and eased, respectively, capital controls or prudential FX measures. Jul-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10 Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11
12-month implied tail risk
Control group
Capital controls on nonresidents (+)
Capital control on residents (-) Prudential FX measure -other (+) 
